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The purpose of this thesis is twofold; <i) Explore some
design issues for building group decision support systems for
non-cooperation environments? and (ii) Expand CO-OP, a
cooperative multiple criteria group decision support system,
to support particular classes of group decisions. From the
conceptual standpoint, this work argues for that cooperation
is a special case of non-cooperation. The following design
requirements ar& proposed: (i) Negotiation as a capability
within model management, (ii) Greater capabilities in
database management, and (iii) Increased flexibility for the
user interface.
The present version of Co-oP has, with this work,
implemented the following features: (i) Scrolling windows to
handle group problems with large size, (ii) Code optimization
to provide fast feedback to members, (iii) Improved
heuristics for the Negotiable Alternatives Identifier (NAI),
(iv) Implementation of the Mediator module, and (v) Allow
more advanced data manipulation to promote data exchange in
competitive environments (e.g., data security and .sharing).
The above implementation has encompassed approximately 6,000
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I . INTRODUCTION
The importance of decision making is readily apparent
throughout the daily activities of individuals or groups,
often reflecting the goals, tasks, and choices selected
during problem solution. Numerous concepts and theories about
individual decision -making endeavor to isolate the decision
making process into a normative set of rules or a descriptive
set of procedures that may be utilized by the decision maker
(Bass, 1983). However, the majority of really crucial events
of the world are a direct result of the group decision-making
process rather than isolated, individual decision making.
Research on decision support systems ( DSS ) has recently
focused its attention on supporting collective decision
making (Huber, 198^). However, all of the contributions so
far have dealt with decision making situations characterized
by trusting and cooperative settings. Bass (1983) argues
that the lack of sufficient cooperation and coordination is
often a determining factor that prevents the group decision
making process from providing valid results. Attempting to
design a computer based decision support system for non-
cooperative decision making situations requires careful
redesign of the requirements and functions that are currently
utilized in many cooperative individual and group decision
support systems ( GDSS )
.
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the issues of
non-cooperation and implements some of the principles in Co-
oP» a group decision support system for cooperative decision
making. The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2
discusses and reviews various concepts and motivating forces
behind decision-making in general, and ultimately applies
these perceptions to group decision-making. This chapter also
discusses the nature and causes of conflict in the collective
decision environment. Chapter 3 explains various processes or
methodologies utilized by associations of individuals to
resolve conflict within a non-cooperative setting. Chapter ^
introduces many of the basic concepts that deal with
individual computerized decision support systems (IDSB); the
latter being designed as a integral part of the GDSS . DSS
design concepts) including data base management, model
management, and dialogue management, ar& briefly reviewed to
provide the reader with a cursory understanding of decision
support systems, prior to the discussion of group decision
support systems (GDSS) that follows in the remaining
chapters. Chapter 5 covers earlier examples of implemented
computer-based group decision support system (GDSS). Design
issues in implementing GDSS for non-cooperation are discussed
in Chapter 6. The requirement analysis in this chapter
concentrates on digital communications and multi-user
database management. Chapter 7 applies some of the
suggestions outlined in the previous chapter to expand a
12
specific GDSS, namely Co-oP. The rationale for using Co-oP
as a basic system architecture is founded on the assumption
that designing a GDSS for cooperation is a special case of
GDSS for non-cooperation. Therefore, it would make sense, at
least from a system design point of view, to implement and
validate the ideas advocated in this work by expanding the
features of a currently operational cooperative GDSS. In this
regard, Chapter 8 proposes a new set of heuristics to support
negotiation, providing that the decision makers accept the
precepts of the negotiable alternative identifier (N.A.I)
algorithm in Co-oP (Bui, 1985). Finally, reflections and
cautions regarding the use of a GDSS to support competitive
decision problems are detailed in Chapter 9.
In summary, the material presented in this thesis should
provide the reader with the major conceptual building blocks
necessary to conduct initial and, possibly, continued
research into the arena of group decision support systems.
Observed as a logical progression of knowledge and
implementation, a GDSS is based upon previous qualitative
decision theory and quantitative computer algorithms. Figure

























Figure 1. Conceptual Building Blocks for a GDSS
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I I
. NON-COOPERATIVE ISSUES IN
COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING
The body of knowledge concerning decision making is
great, portraying a large spectrum of issues. This chapter
considers primarily that portion of decision theory that
deals with collective decision making and non-cooperation. In
order to define "non-cooperation", a review of cooperative
decision making is conducted. The primary purpose for this
discussion is to identify some common areas of concern for
decision makers. Once these limitations are known? possible
solutions may be attempted through conversion into computer-
based algorithms. These algorithms might be thought of as
based in the many-faceted dec i sion- theory environment.
A. COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING
A collective decision-making process is characterized by
the following traits; (i) There are two or more individuals
involved, each with their own explicit personalities, (ii)
each player recognizes the existence of a unigue and common
problem, and (iii) the group will attempt to reach a
collective decision (Bui, 198^+). A group may attempt to reach
consensus during simultaneous discussions, or they might
separately reach conclusions, and then regroup to
collectively challenge and discuss the results.
15
A unique type of collective decision making often
encountered is one in which there is effectively only one
decision maker. In group decision-making with one person? the
decision is made by a specific individual who assumes full
responsibility for the outcome (Bui, 1985). Since this
accountable individual maintains a strong supporting infra-
structure, the decision is regarded as collective. Swap
(198^) defines this entity as the "responsible individual."
This decision maker is the person in the organization
assigned decision responsibility and authority in a certain
functional area. This singular entity may not always be the
apparent decision maker, however, the actions of the group
will often reveal whether the designated responsible
individual has authority and power to influence others.
Authority may be defined as "the power to make decisions
which guide the behavior of subordinates" (Simon, 1961).
There appears to be numerous factors that determine the
strength and responsiveness of the supporting infrastructure
or "dense network of influences" provided this responsible
individual within the group decision making Brerta.i (i) his or
her attitude on the administrative hierarchy, (ii) the line
or staff character of the responsible individual's position,
(iii) the manner in which the responsible individual obtained
the position, (iv) the role the individual has been asked to
assume (or has assumed for him or herself) in the group or
organization, (v) the personality and management style of the
16
individual which is important to the relationship with the
decision group, and, (vi) the degree of support and loyalty
that the individual can command among the members of the
group. These considerations strongly affect the guality and
strength of the leadership possessed by the leader in a
"leader-member" group with cohesi veness . However, this
particular type of "collective decision making" is unilateral
in nature. For this thesis, we focus more on problems that
involve a multilateral form of interpersonal relationship or
problem solving.
B. COOPERATIVE VERSUS NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING
In a cooperative decision-making situation, the decision
makers attempt to reach a common decision in a friendly and
trusting manner, and share the responsibility for that
decision. Consensus, compromise, negotiation, and voting
stratagem are instances of this type of group decision
mak i ng
.
According to Fischer <1980), the term consensus can bear
different meanings. Many individuals view consensus as the
desire of the majority which results from democratic proces-
ses. Others presume that unanimity is required for consensus.
Still others believe in a pursuit of common goal, which often
does not call for a formal vote but results in an implicit
agreement by the group members. The reaching of consensus
within groups means that members may agree with a decision,
17
even unanimously, but not reach the final goal. The
distinguishing point is highlighted by Zaleznik and Moment
( 1964, p . 129)
:
Our meaning of consensus lies in the degree of personal
commitment the members feel toward the group decision after,
it is reached. This means, for example, that even though
some members might disagree with the decision on principle,
they will accept it and personally carry out their part.
Their emotional commitment to the group is measured by
willingness to put the plan decided on into effect, in
their own personal behavior.
A compromise is a solution, or at least a settlement of
differences, whereby each side makes concessions (Zeleny,
1982). A consensus is a collective opinion or agreement.
There can be many compromise solutions, but only one consen-
sus. A group can define different compromise solutions; one
of them will emerge as a consensus.
The fact that a decision is made and carried out to its
ultimate conclusion would seem to lead one to believe that
the group members reached consensus and were highly committed
to achievement of the final goal. At least from the viewpoint
of the public, and possibly the decision-makers themselves,
the decision was made in a cooperative setting.
In many cases, the conseguence of a decision belies its
very nature, in that what was initially thought of as a
cooperative environment, actually upon closer examination
turned out to be a non-cooperative decision situation with
uncertain results. It is the purpose of this chapter to look
18
more deeply into the various aspects of decision making in a
non-cooperative atmosphere.
In the non-cooperative decision situation? the decision
makers play the role of adversaries or disputants. Common
forms of non-cooperative decision making often originate as
conflict and competition. Uhile the former represents a
situation in which disputants seek to impair their opponents
to pursue their own interest, the latter is characterized by
the fact that each competitor actively attempts to outperform
each other
.
As decision makers struggle for a mutually acceptable
option, differences among them in perceptions, cognition,
values, interests, needs, and preferred alternatives give
rise to conflicts (Bui, 1986). Conflict is usually most
evident in elaborate organizations with highly differentiated
structures and operating in an unpredictable environment.
Tasks are often highly complex within this framework. The
differences in the needs and interests of each individual
member and the organization as a whole may generate conflict.
It is also generated by differences between organizational
entities such as departments. Higher authority and great
power may be engaged to resolve this conflict, or the
conflict may be settled adaptively in a collective manner
utilizing negotiation and bargaining. Mediators and
arbitrators may be employed. A mutually advantageous
solution, one that is agreeable to all parties and nearly
19
optimal* may be gained through the integration of conflicting
interests rather than merely attempting to compromise' one
side over the other (Bass, 1983).
Coalitions are alliances of organization members comb-
ining their individual powers? resources? and persuasive
efforts to achieve greater influence on decision processes
than the members could accomplish alone. Coalitions are
commonly observed when conflicting interests are present in a
group or organization. To increase one's negotiating power,
an individual may join forces with others in the larger group
in order to establish informal cliques and coalitions that
will exercise influence over decisions made. Kahan and
Rapaport (198^) relate that whenever three or more parties
get together to jointly resolve an issue of substantive
interest to all of them, it is likely that at least two of
them will at some point in time combine forces to their
mutual advantage. When this combining of forces is
intentional, or executed with the full awareness of all
joining parties, a coalition is being formed.
C. CONFLICT AS CAUSES OF NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING
Conflict often occurs in both individual and collective
decision-making processes. Zeleny (1982) defines conflict as
when multiple distinct strategies, selected as the means of
achieving goals or objectives, are mutually exclusive. This
occurs when the strategies become mutually exclusive
20
alternatives, each capable of satisfying only a portion or a
particular aspect of a given goal complex. The following are
neccessary conditions of a conflicting situation:
(1) One or more decision makers.
(2) Two or more available alternatives of choice.
(3) One or more objectives or criteria of choice.
With respect to the above conditions? conflict exists
whenever interaction by multiple (two or more) decision
makers uniguely affects their respective environments, and
the nature of their interaction is such that it is not
possible for all these individuals to simultaneously achieve
their desired goals (Kahan and Rapaport, 198^).
The organizational decision process is one source of
conflict that is inherent in group decision making since it
must meet what may be incompatible multiple criteria of
acceptance. The personal interests of the decision makers
usually need to be satisfied. Finally, the decision needs to
be accepted by those responsible for authorizing and
implementing it (Bass, 19B3).
A second source of conflict is due to the way information
flows in the organization or group environment. Instead of an
orderly progression through the established hierarchy, it
follows a grid of communications made up of conflicting
channels (Bass, 1993).
21
Third, disagreement about means or ends can lie between
the multiple relationships established within groups or
organizations. Organizations find it difficult to tolerate
the enterprizing manager and expect only orderly advances.
Not forgiving of surprises, corporate management often fail
to reward this kind of risk taking and overemphasize the
obtaining of immediate or short-term goals, at the expense of
distant, future ones (Bass, 1983).
A fourth, and important source of conflict arises in the
allocation of resources. When corporate leaders attempt to
allocate resources optimally, they, in actuality, only
approach the ideal. The allocation process often create
turmoil or conflict within corporate ranks since the attempt
at optimality may reduce perceived "slack" throughout the
organization. Therefore, this reduction may not be not seen
as beneficial by individual groups, with this slack regarded
as necessary buffers against complex timetables (Bass, 19B3)
.
A final source of conflict is change itself. On many
occasions new but extremely different alternatives to
entrenched policies a.re seen by organizations as dangerous
and not considered in any methodical and distinct way (Bass,
1983)
.
D. GENERAL APPROACHES TO DEAL WITH CONFLICTS
Zeleny (1982) delineates neglect, containment, control,
and denial, as four ways of dealing with conflict. However,
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although the last four are often used, they are complex and
hard to reduce into formal terms or study in a structured
methodology. A decision maker may disregard, neglect, or
ignore a conflict or one can also attempt to contain conflict
or "freeze" it to gain time and let things cool off. Since a
conflict is usually not a well-defined, unambiguous state of
affairs, it is often more convenient to contain it. An
individual may attempt to control conflict by adding
constraints that limit the results or outcomes. One form of
controlled conflict is competition, since it is in reality
conflict constrained by pre-determi ned rules. Another method
is to deny the existence of conflict, therby acknowledging
only the existance of a certain situation, but then advancing
a different, often very imaginative translation in conflict-
free terminology. Therefore, conflict denial is often
observed when art organization or individual freely uses per-
suasion, propaganda, and brainwashing.
Ackoff (1978) describes three more methods for dealing
with conflict: so 1 ut ion , r eso 1 ut i on , and d i sso 1 u t i on . The
resolution of conflict is the subject of numerous unilateral
and multilateral methodologies that are more flexible and
attempt to reach the ideal maximization of outcomes for both
parties in a conflict. The benefits to a singular entity or
parties is often accomplished through mediation. The task of
the mediator in a group decision-making process can be
23
either; (i) seek to impartially resolve a dispute or (ii) be
a judge who wants to end a conflict (Bui, 1985).
In order to resolve a conflict the individual or group
should be aware of possible multiple objectives that take
into account the other individuals involved. In the normal
sense? conflict resolution seeks to obtain a compromise, a
settlement, or a consensus. In most cases, as discussed
above, the "fair" and eguitable conclusion may be reached by
negotiation, bargaining, and arbitration. (Zeleny, 1982)
The dissolution of conflict is very often attempted by
decision makers, however, this complete removal of conflict
is seldom accomplished, the result of which may result in
further conflict.
Solving a conflict is characterized by a single
individual or group's single objective, and its maximization
or optimization is the sole criterion for action (Zeleny,
1982). One may presc r i p t l ve 1 y accept the factors that induced
the conflict, only to do whatever is necessary to obtain a
the best outcome one can. For example, a decision maker might
try to solve a strike, by outwardly accepting it, and then
closing the plant down.
E. SUMMARY
The major point of this chapter was is not to provide an
a 1 1 -encompassing discource concerning decision-making theory
(i.e., alternative selection, conflict and its' resolution,
etc. ) , but to indicate to the prospective developer of an
individual or group decision support system the importance of
this material within DSS design constraints. To relegate
decision theory to the peripheral of DSS or GDSS development
js akin to building a home without its foundation. One must
first recognize that an organization or group of decision
makers' utilize a specific method for problem solving. In
other words, a DSS built for a chief Executive Officer (CEO)
used to making unilateral decisions will differ greatly then
one built for a group used to resolving problems through
med i a t i on
.
Secondly? one must realize that a decision support system
must be developed in stages. This is correctly performed with
Co-oP, a group decision support system (GDSS), which is
discussed in later chapters of this thesis. First) the
premise is made (and implemented) that the GDSS will utilize
a group resolution decision-theoretic approach to problem
solving. Secondly, the cooperative decision-making approach
is implemented to prove that the system works. The next stage
in development is to develop a module for non-cooperative
decision making. Concurrent to this accomplishment, a
mediatior module is developed to define rules of interaction
within the group decision process. Finally, other modules
reflecting numerous other decision making approaches may be
implemented as development continues.
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III. RESOLUTION METHODOLOGIES FOR
NON-COOPERATIVE SETTINGS
This chapter moves the discussion of group decision
making one step further, and represents a limited view of
various frameworks within which conflict is resolved. Within
these structures a conflict may be "resolved" utilizing
either non-computer-based or computer-based procedures. The
major point to understand is that, depending on ones' view of
the decision making process? and acceptance of possible group
problem resolution, the method chosen to accomplish this
process may have a great effect on the ultimate outcome.
Whatever technique is used; (i) aggregation of
preferences, (ii) process-oriented tools, (iii) bootstrapping
methods, (iv) multiple criteria decision making ( MCDM
)
methods, or (v) a combination, the final framework or model
(in the case of a DSS or GDSS ) has to reflect the inherent
capabilities and limitations within the system.
A. AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES
There are two types of aggregation of opinions or prefer-
ences. The first is mathematical and the second is
behavioral. Because the mathematical technique of aggregation
of preferences is relatively easy to use and apparently
simple upon interpretation, it is often used over the
26
behavioral method within the group decision making
environment. (Wright, 1985)
Although it would appear to the uninitiated user that
there is a one-to-one, or linear relationship between an
individuals' preference and the agreggation of many in a
group preference output, technigues of aggregation of
preferences have complexities and anomolies that tend to
cloud the picture more than would be thought during initial
use. The most common problem is, that given a group of
individuals utilizing decision matrices, each individual will
probably prefer a different alternative for the same set of
criteria on the basis of expected utility. After all
individuals have selected their preferred alternatives, an
aggregation of choices would be conducted to seek a decision
or choice for the entire group. However, different algorithms
or methods of aggregation will have different results and
lead to conflict. If a group decision matrix is formed by
averaging the probabilities and summing the individual
utilities to obtain group utility, one outcome is preferred
on the basis of expected utility.
If the members vote on pairs of actions or sum of the
ranks of their individual preferences based on their own
expected utility, then a different outcome ensues.
The differences in outcomes due to the use of various
aggregation technigues become explicit and numerous methods
27
may be used in a single DSS to obtain a more uniform group
dec i s i on
.
However, inconsistencies may occur even when there is
group agreement on the final outcome because of the following
reasons
:
(1) Point estimates of unknown quantities are often
thought to be linear or fixed in nature rather than
probabilistic distributions.
(2) The quality of a group decision may depend on the
group size for groups of different expertise and
independence
.
(3) Biased judgments may appear to be averaged and of
higher quality if aggregated over a large group.
However, although the average can be more accurate
then the best member some of the time, it cannot be
so on the average. Therefore a simple weighted
average will fall between the group consensus and the
best member
.
<*+) In correlated judgments, the individual preferences
are not independent in the statistical sense.
B. PROCESS-ORIENTED TOOLS
The process—or iented approach is based on the view that
if one understands the decision process, then one can
correctly estimate the outcome. Primarily descriptive in
nature, this process rests on the principle that knowledge of
how decisions are made can instruct us how they should be
made (Zeleny, 1982). Three process-oriented approaches to
group decision found in the literature (Van de Ven , 197^)
are; (i) the interacting approach, (ii) the nominal group
process, and <ii) the Delphi process.
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The first and most widely used approach is the
interacting group method, in which collective decision making
occurs within a group setting and all communication acts take
place between members with minimal restraints imposed by
formal configuration of structure (Delbecq, 196B). The
resultant decision is reached after a process of (i)
unstructured group discussion for gaining and merging ideas
of participants, and (ii> majority voting on priorities by
hand count
.
The nominal group technigue is a structured group meeting
in which decision makers perform in the proximity of others
but do not interact in an explicit or verbal manner with
other group members for a specified period of time. Each
individual is tasked with the writing of ideas on a physical
or electronic note-pad during this ensuing period. At the
completion of this interval each individual in round-robin
fashion contributes one idea from his or her tabulation to be
documented by a recorder. The round-robin is in effect until
no further ideas are presented, and then a spontaneous
discussion occurs among the group. As a final step, voting by
all the members is conducted, with the group decision being
the aggregated or pooled outcome of the individual votes.
This method of group decision making is recapitulated in the
following order (Van de Ven, 197A-): (i) Silent generation of
ideas in writing; (ii) Recorded round-robin feedback from
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each member for presentation of ideas to the group* (iii)
discussion of recorded ideas to evaluate information; and
(iv) silent individual voting on priorities.
Participants in the Delphi process are physically
separated and do not meet as a group for decision-making.
This procedure is one way of seeking and finally aggregating
group judgments on a particular issue through a set of
carefully designed guest i onna i res . To conduct the Delphi
process, at least two separate groups of individuals and at
least four roles or functions for individual groups are
reguired. There is a user body in which the individuals are
expecting a product from the exercise which is useful to
their purposes. A design and monitor team, which may be
separate groups, designs the initial guest ionna i re
,
summarizes the returns, and re-designs the subseguent quest-
ionnaires. The respondent group is chosen to respond to the
questionnaires and may sometimes be the user group or a
subset of the respondent group .
The sequence of decision making in the Delphi process
occurs in the following order : (i) One group responds to the
first questionaire with independent generation of
information; (ii) A synopsis and feedback of the replies to
the first questionnaire by the design and monitoring team;
(iii) Providing a response to the second questionaire through
detached voting on ideas by a rank order procedure; and (iv)
Final aggregation and feedback to the respondent group of
30
concluding priorities by the design and monitoring team. The
qualitative differences between nominal, interacting, and
Delphi processes are described by Van de Ven (197^) in Table
1. These differences are based upon analysis of evaluations
of leaders and group participants of various organizations.
C. BOOTSTRAPPING AIDS
Bootstrapping aids serve to display and automate policy
or rules, which then put into effect normatively delineated
principles already generated through advice from experts
(Wright, 1985). Bootstrapping allows the appraisal of the
structure within which the problem is assessed. From this
basis, the process of the decision-making operations are
predefined. The general idea of bootstrapping rests on the
view that if a computer-designed decision aid can be
developed that captures the interpretive powers and judgmen-
tal principles of art expert, then its performance will be at
least as good as or better than, the expert's unaided
evaluation. An interesting outcome of this aid is that the
expert's process will be protected, or "frozen" against the
bias of such changing variables as stress and boredom.
Additionally, variables of this nature may not be included
within the confines of the established model.
Linear statistical models are usually the basis for
bootstrapping methods, and may useful when the same
predictive evaluations have to be performed on a repetitive
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basis. Camerer (1981). in conducting a survey of boots-
trapping methods* concluded that "bootstrapping will improve
judgments slightly under almost any realistic task
cond ition.
"
The ability of a bootstrapping aid to be effectively
predictive is determined by a linear relationship between the
predictor variables within the model and the external
criteria (Dawes and Corrigan, 197^).
Two limitations to the overall use of bootstrapping
implementations are; (i) The variables within the system do
not alter with a change in expert (Hoffman? I960), and (ii)
The overall model remains valid? or the representative
decision process remains the same. As soon as additional
variables become applicable, the model, and its use will lead
to diminished, or even incorrect results. Since the primary
aspect of the system is to represent to the maximum the
expert knowledge strategy, it does not have to mirror the
exact cognitive processes involved in order to consider its
output satisfactory.
D. DECOMPOSITION AIDS
One of the roles of a decision aid is to assist the
decision maker or group in symbolizing their problems within
the limitations of a formalized decision structure. Once the
problem structure has been defined, computer-designed
r ecompos i t i on aids can be utilized to aggregate the common
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TABLE 1. QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES FOR NOMINAL,






Unstruct. grou P Structured group Struc tured
Method- meet i ng meet i ng quest i ona ire
o logy Hi gh flexibili ty Low flexibility Low Var i ab i
-
Hi gh vari ab i 1
i
ty Low variability 1 i ty
Role Soc io-emotiona 1 Balanced focus Task-instru-
Or i ent
.
group ma int. on soc i a 1 ma i nt ment a 1
of Proc
.
focus and task role focus
Rel at i ve Low Higher High
Quant i ty
of Ideas
Qua 1 i ty Low qua 1 i ty Higher quality Hi gh qua 1 l ty
Spec if i c
.
General i zations Hi gh spec i f i c
.
H i gh spec i
-
of ideas f i c i ty
Search Reac t i ve Proac t i ve Proac t i ve
Behav i or Shor t prob 1 em Extended prob. Contro 1 1 ed
prob 1 em
Normat i ve Conformi ty Tolerance for Freedom not
Behav i or pressures non-conformi ty to conform
Equal i ty Member dominance Member equality Respondent
of par tic equa 1 i ty
Method of Person-centere d Prob 1 em- Prob 1 em-
Prob lem centered centered
So 1 v i ng
Dec i sion High 1 ac k Lower lack Low lack
Closure of closure of c 1 osure of c 1 osure
Att i tude Low task High task W i thdr awn
Toward mo t i vat ion mot i vat ion task
Task mot i vat ion
Prob 1 em
Source: Van de Ven, 197^, pp. 96-97
33
ingredients within the structure. Due to the nature of these
type of aids, users have to be proficient in analytical
methods so that a valid structure may be applied to the
associated problem.
Recompos i t i on aids are used primarily for the task of
performing laborious and often repetitive computational
operations. One system is designed to use hierarchical
mu 1 t i at tr ibute utility decomposition in order to analyze
problems that are characterized by a large number of
attributes or criteria (Saaty, 1980). Other systems can be
used to examine alternative courses of action, incorporating
a mixture of intermediate decisions and uncertain events.
Bootstrapping aids can be described as those that aim to
replace the decision maker by automating the entire sequence
of the decision-making operation and assisting the user in
introducing content within an established decision-making
procedure. Opposite this, r ecompos i t i on aids are those that
serve to aid the decision maker in the integration and
further examination of the contents specified within the
formalized decision model.
The methods discussed above cover. decision aids that have
been carried out after a formal problem structure has been
defined, and rely on the implementation of good programming
techniques defined by; (i) the constraints of decision
associated algorithms, (ii) the design of the user-system
interface, and (iii) the availability of computer technology.
3^
'However, the discussion has not touched on decision aids that
are designed to be operational before the decision problem
has been clearly formalized.
E. PROBLEM-STRUCTURING AIDS
Problem-structuring decision aids give a decision maker
the opportunity to build a representation of the problem by
integrating the component parts of the problem and the
clarifying relationships between them. Most problem-
structuring aids include editing programs and repetitive
modules that allow the decision maker to inject new infor-
mation into the problem structure as it is initiated or as
the need for it is conceived. One example is MAUD^t (Humphreys
and Wisudha, 1983) that uses a series of pr econstr uc ted
displays that prompt the decision maker to decompose the
decision problem in stages. Information entered by the
decision maker is used to prompt for further elements of the
decision problem resulting in the construction of a problem
structure through an iterative process.
F. MULTIPLE-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING
The term "multiple-criteria decision making" (MCDM),
signifies an interest in the universal category of problems
that deal with multiple attributes, objectives, and goals.
Therefore, with multiple-criteria decision making MCDM is
utilized to resolve conflict within and between groups. To
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resolve a conflict involves the consideration of multiple
objectives. It accepts the conditions which created the
conflict, and seeks a compromise, a settlement, or a
consensus. Each party usually gives up something it origin-
ally desired. Both parties strive for a "fair" distribution
of gains and losses. Negotiation, bargaining, and arbitration
are common tools for seeking conflict resolution. In
collective decision making it is often the case that multiple
objectives and also multiple decision makers interact. Some
sort of compromise then becomes mandatory.
G. GAME THEORY
Game theory was created to study the structure and resol-
ution of conflict. The theory of games is a collection of
formal models for studying decision making in conflict
situations that are most easily displayed as games of strate-
gy. The distinctive quality of game theory as related to
decision making tasks is that the outcome to a particular
participant, known as a player, depends not only on his own
choices and the variability of chance, but also on the
choices of one or more other paticipant. Players are normally
the autonomous decision maker. However, centers of interest
may be developed when two or more individuals decide to
jointly agree upon a coordination of efforts resulting in a
decision which might not be guaranteed if acting
independently. The specified consequence to each player, are
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necessarily uncertain, because the choices of the other play-
ers are not known with certainty.
The defining quality of a cooperative game is that
players may enter into mutually binding agreements. The
assumptions underlying this approach are: (i) negotiations
are mandatory with a view that previous conversation must
take place; (ii) all previous signals discussed by each
player are communicated without deception to their intended
targets; (iii) all agreements are binding and enforceable by
the rules, and; (iv) all results are unaffected by the prior
negotiation process. The term "cooperative" for this type of
game comes from the fact that players may conspire to their
mutual benefit. A noncooperat i ve game is one in which binding
agreements prior to decisions are not permitted.
Superadd i t ivi ty is a property of cooperative games that
says that any two disjoint coalitions cart do at "Teast as well
by joint effort as they can separately.
Essential to game theory is the dichotomy of constant—sum
vs. nonconstant—sum. The most important reason for the dis-
tinction between constant-sum and nonconst ant-sum games is
that in the former, any difference in payoff between two
outcomes for one player must be compensated for by differ-
ences in opposite sign in the payoffs of other players. In
other words, if the game is constant-sum, whatever one player
gains in proposing one outcome over another, the remaining
players collectively must lose. When only two players are in
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the gamei this means that their interests will always be
diametrically opposed. However, the n-person constant-sum
game is not one of pure conflict, as it may be possible for
each of a group of players to gain at the expense of the
rema i nder
.
In nonconstant—sum games, gains realized by one player
when moving from one outcome to another need not be compen-
sated for by losses of the other players. In these games,
interest centers on whether or not there ar& solutions that
enable players to arrive at those cells which maximize the
total payoff to all players. Another concern, less demanding
than joint gain maximization, is whether outcomes ar e Pareto
optimal. An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other
outcome such that all of the players do better in the latter
then the former. While all jointly maximum outcomes ar<E
Pareto optimal, the converse is not- true since transfers
among coalitions are prohibited.
Joint dec i sion—mak ing versus negotiating outlines the
conditions by which members either work together to solve a
problem or negotiate an acceptable joint decision. Problem
solving occurs when the joint gain available to both parties
is variable. It is a non-zero sum game from which both par-
ties emerge as winners. The total payoffs to both parties
will depend on their abilities to discover the compatibility
of their interests and to discover or find ways to work
together for mutual profit.
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On the opposing side, bargaining to reach a decision
occurs when the joint profit available to both parties is
fixed, and , for the present, their relative shares have not
been determined. Whatever one side gains is at the expense of
the other. Therefore, it is a zero-sum game. One party is
likely to attempt to modify the other party's perceptions of
the benefits of various courses of actions so that the other
party will be less resistant to a decision favored by the
first party. The first party is to attempt to structure the
other party's expectations about what outcomes would be
minimally acceptable to the first party. The negotiators will
take immovable positions and make threats to prevent the
opposition from implementing the same operations. Any earlier
commitments which become untenable will be rationalized away
(Bass, 1983)
.
Resolution of conflict among multiple decision makers is
often approached from the viewpoint of game theory, charac-
terized by formulations with multiple payoffs. In addition to
the discussion above concerning zero and non-zero sum games,
the prisoners' dilemma illustrates another type of compromise
programming used in collective decision making. An example of
the prisoners' dilemma is shown in Table 2.
This a non-zero-sum game in which wins of one do not
cancel the losses of the other. Being rational, according to
game theory, Suspect 1 determines his strategy by taking into
account all possible actions of Suspect 2.
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If Suspect 1 confesses, then he can either get 5 years or
go free depending on his partner's two options, if he remains
silent he can get either 20 years or 1 year in jail. Sym-
metrically, Suspect 2 finds out that he too is better off if
he confesses. The dilemma is: if they heed the very best
advise and confess, they will both wind up with five years in















Source: Zeleny, 1982, p. 357
jail. If they both disallow the advise and remain silent,
then they will remain in jail for only 1 year. According to
von Neuman and Morgenstern (1982) traditional game theory
fails at this point, where contact is made with more real-
istic conflict situations.
H. SUMMARY
Research on the social psychology of conflict emphasizes
the need for striving cooperatively rather than with
<*0
competitive motivation (Douglas, 1962, Morley and Stephesen,
1977). Such a motion stresses the necessity to shift from an
initial competitive (or even hostile) stage to a more co-
operative one. The ideal group problem solving in a non-co-
operative environment should be characterized by a gradually
evolving, cooperative search for mutually acceptable, equi-
table, and innovative solutions with which the group members
feel that their individual objectives are met rather than
scoring a "victory" over the others. While each party should
actively strive to protect and advance their own interests,
this should be done with a view to seeking arrangements that
will benefit the other party as well. Furthermore, when there
is a mediator, maintaining a cooperative orientation also
applies to the helping mediator.
Assuming that the adoption of a cooperative orientation
is the key to -a constructive conflict resolution leads to the
hypothesis that non-cooperation is a general case of co-
operative decision-making. Therefore, from a system design
point of view, it would make a great deal of sense to build
non-cooperative Group Decision Support Systems ( GDSS ) in such
a way that they can transform a competitive problem into a
cooperative one.
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IV. DESIGN ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
A generalized decision support system may be viewed as an
interactive computer designed and implemented system that
assists decision makers to solve unstructured problems
utilizing data, models, and a dialogue or interface sub-
system (Sprague and Carlson, 1982). The above definition
seems to precisely delineate the internal workings of a
decision support system, and may leave the reader with a
perception that numerous "computer-based systems" have been
developed today that easily perform to this ideal. However,
further discussion of the special characteristics of both
individual and group DSS are in order. It is interesting to
note that although this discussion deals solely with an
individual decision support system, and not a group decision
support system, the basic model should remain intact except
for added requirements determined by the collective decision
process. As seen in Chapters 1 through 3, ones' understanding
of decision theory may be utilized to build a framework or
model in which to solve a series of problems in a group
environment. At this juncture, a DSS or GDSS (such as Co-oP)
may be developed.
The three stages of decision making are intelligence, de-
sign, and choice (Simon, 1960). Intelligence is described as
a methodology required to search the environment for
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conditions that require decisions. This phase requires the.
collection of general data which is processed and then
examined for trends indicating problems.
Design relates to the aspects of taking possible problems
and creating, and analyzing possible solutions or courses of
bc t i on
.
Choice involves the selection of a particular solutions
with subsequent implementation.
These "stages of decision making" assist an individual in
understanding that decisions are made in a highly structured,
sequential manner. The above stages of dec i sion—mak i ng are
critical in that they underly the objectives that a decision
support system must satisfy (Sprague and Carlson 1982). A DSS
should be required to support all three stages of decision-
making and facilitate interaction between the phases.
A second objective that must be met by a DSS is the
support of difficult, under spec i f i ed or unstructured
decisions as well as structured decisions. Unstructured
decisions may be defined as having a decision-making process
that does not allow prior description of the problem before
making the decision (Simon, 1960). Ad Hoc decisions are often
unstructured because of unique circumstances, time pressures,
limited or lacking knowledge, or many other reasons.
A decision support system should enhance decision making
at all levels of an organization and integrate tasks between
these levels. Based on Anthony's (1965) analysis, these
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levels or tasks are; (i) strategic planning; or decisions
associated with setting corporate policy, choosing
objectives? and selecting resources, (ii) management control;
decisions related to assuring effectiveness in acquisition
and use of resources, (iii) operational control; decisions
related to assuring effectiveness in performing operations,
and (iv) operational performance; decisions made in perform-
ing the operations. In order for these organizational levels
or tasks to have effective meaning a range of information is
required. At the operational level the information should be
current, timely, and exact. The strategic level requires
information that is historical, or summary-type information.
Also, the decision tasks inherent at each level range from
immediate, highly structured tasks that might be seen at the
operational level to those 1 onger -range , unstructured
decision tasks at the strategic level.
The communications between decision makers support
interdependent decision making and are illustrated by
numerous classifications of decision makers. Hackathorn and
Keen (1981) list three main types as Independent, Sequential
Interdependent, and Pooled Interdependent. With independent
decision making, a decision maker has full responsibility and
authority to make a completely executable decision. With
sequential interdependent decision making, the decision maker
makes part of a decision which is passed on to someone else.
Finally, with pooled interdependent, the decision must result
from negotiation and interaction among decision makers. Due
to the differences in decision making, different capabilities
(i.e.? personal support? organizational support, and group
support) will be required to support each type of decision-
Reviewed briefly above, a decision support system must
support a variety of decision-making processes but not be
dependent on any single entity. This individual DSS must
provide support that is process independent and under full
control by the user (manager). It should be gener a 1 i zab 1 e in
nature, and easy to use and modify in response to changes in
the user, the task, or the environment.
The representation of decision problems can be defined
in terms of three structures, which bear a correspondence to
the three types of decision aiding systems; bootstrapping,
recomposi t ion , and problem-structuring (Wright, 19B2). The
first method is problem representation with fixed structures.
Here, the formal problem structure is predefined for a
particular type of application. It is used repetitively to
analyze different sets of contents. This method requires a
simple interface within the decision making process that
monitors information that is entered in the correct format
and deals with erroneous entries. Although appraisals using
the decision aid may be performed by art assistant, the
decision maker will likely become familiar with its
procedural use and become the sole user of the system.
However, should further development and implementation be
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deemed necessary by the decision maker, the analyst or
developer may again enter the arena to perform the task.
Problems falling in the "assumed structure" category are
those that require the decision maker and a system developer
to generate a pre-defined structure or model such that the
data required for the analysis of the problem is ready in a
form appropriate for entry into a chosen decision model.
Using an assumed structure) the role of this decision aid is
to operate on the given structure, manipulating the
designated data and combining it using algorithms that obey
decision recomposi t i on rules. The difficulties are
encountered due to conflicts in opinion and proposes
requisite modeling as a compromise. Requisite modeling
requires that everything needed to solve the problem must be
included in the model, or if the material does not fit in the
basic model then at least it be incorporated in simulation
operations to determine its effect.
The last structure portrayed by Wright (1982) deals with
elicited structures. It is within the decision-making
processes where the set of alternatives are known but where
poor structure dominates and the analyst may be unavailable
for assistance.
In these cases decision aids play a far more important
and complex role, especially since the decision maker is
uncertain about the ways in which to construe a subjective
preference structure. It appears that in these situations the
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content of the problem and the structure of the problem is
"fuzzy." It requires an active cooperation between the decis-
ion maker and the decision aid itself in order to determine
the structure that accurately represents the decision
problem. Because the structure is elicited from the user, it
requires a large amount of direct input. At the same time the
user will rely heavily on the structural guidance of the DSS
.
Finally, one would conclude that this type of problem
formulation require decision support systems that are capable
of eliciting information about the problem in the most
flexible and optimal manner. The problem structure appears to
be one in which the DSS and the user interact in order to
define and isolate both the specifics of the "unstructured"
problem and the optimal DSS structure that will be utilized
to answer similar questions.
Sprague and Carlson (19S2) portray the components of an
individual DSS as the dialog or interface subsystem, data
subsystem, and the models subsystem. The individual
subsystems and their relationships are portrayed in Figure 2.
The DBMS stands for the data base management software;
MBMS for models base management software; and DGMS for dialog
generation and management software. The important point to
make is that the entire schematic represents a decision
support system that may be observed from different levels or
aspects such as; the user, the developer, and, as some refer









Figure 2. Generalized Components o"F a DSS (Sprague and
Carlson, 19B2, p. 29)
The dialogue or interface management software would seem
to be the most important part of this individual DSS since it
manages the interaction between the system and the user.
Without a clear and comprehensive link between the user
and a system that is supposed to assist in decision making,
much of the power, flexibility, and usability characteristics
of the system would be lost. More importantly, without a
strong interface between user and system, the DSS would lose
its value to the individual user, or the group. Bennett
(1977) decomposes this user-system interface into the action
language, the display or presentation language* and the
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knowledge base. The action language is what the user can do
to communicate with the system or provide input. The
presentation language is what the user sees or visual output.
The knowledge base is what the user must know in order to
effectively use a specific DSS
.
The data subsystem refers to the interaction of internal
and external data sources? since decision making relies
heavily on data and information not normally found in the
strict transaction processing system ( TPS ) . The "data base"
approach allows the DSS and the DBMS system to be flexible
enough to allow rapid additions and changes in response to
adhoc requests by the user. The data base should have the
ability to combine a variety of data sources through a data
capture and extraction process. It should also have the
ability to handle personal data so that the user can
experiment with alternatives based on experience or
judgement
.
A data base is normally defined as a collection of data
items stored in computer memory, while a data base management
system is usually defined as a supervisory program used to
create, maintain, access, update, and protect data bases.
Since data is used by organizations for planning, control,
and operation, a DSS planned for a group of decision makers
will include external and internal data bases in order to
conduct these functions. When the DSS provides the data
collection and maintenance functions, data sharing among DSS
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may be difficult because of the data structures chosen or
because of the desire to limit access to data which are
particular to each DSS - If data sharing is difficult,
maintenance of redundant data is likely. Sprague and Carlson
(1982) suggests the design and building of a data base before
DSS implementation because:
(1) The data base simplifies collection and maintenance
of the data used by the DSS.
(2) The data base limits the set of functions and users
that the DSS needs to support.
(3) It simplifies the design of the DSS.
(^) It eliminates potential conflicting performance and
security requirements.
(5) The data base increases the chances of data sharing
among DSS.
The above discussion points one to the conclusion that if
a data base and its attendant DBMS are an initial design
issue for a DSS, then there will be reduced costs of building
and using the DSS, increased data control and sharing, and
reduced data redundancy.
Another primary reason for installing a DBMS as an integ-
ral component of a DSS is its ability to integrate a variety
of internal and external data that is required in decision
making. The five data models used, at least for external
data, are the record model, relational model, hierarchic
model , network model , and the rule model
.
The record model has a data structure combines data
fields into records, and the data base is a combination of
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records. The operations generally conducted within this
structure pertain to updating, deleting, and selecting a
specific record. The limitations of the record structure are;
(i) Each record must contain a key field whose value is
unigue, (ii) Record structures are "frozen" in that new
record types cannot be added, and (iii) Every field must
contain a value.
The relational model limits the data structure in order
to take advantage of "flat files" wherein a field or
attribute may not be repeated. This allows the structure to
consist of relations based on predefined domains for
specified fields. Therefore, this data structure consists of
attributes (columns in a table) and tuples (rows in the same
table). The characteristics of the relational model are;
(i) The operations in this model operate on entire relations
rather than on individual records, and (ii) The operations do
not depend on the order of the fields or of the records. In
other words there is a logical/physical independence between
the logical data structure and the physical data storage. The
constraints of this model are that each tuple must contain a
unigue set of values, and that normal forms must be conformed
to. These constraints preserve the relationships among fields
in a relation.
The hierarchic model utilizes multi-level trees to set up
one-to-one relationships among records. In other words, the
structures in the hierarchic model contains data captured in
51
fields in the relational model. The hierarchy of data values
is primary. This means that certain records must exist prior
to the existence of others. Therefore, every data structure
must have a root record, and no instance of a descendant
record can exist without a parent record. Lastly, this model
contains multiple copies of data instances which produces
data redundancy.
The network model is similar to the tree or hierarchical
model, except that it utilizes explicit or named links among
the records to establish relationships. The resulting struc-
ture is many-to-many and thus support navigation in
operations through a two-way link. The primary constraints in
this structure are the maintenance of the links and the
parent-child constraints.
The rule model is normally used in artificial intelli-
gence applications and is based upon production rules for
structure. This knowledge based structure relies on data that
describes rules that allows decision making based on an
inference engine.
A generalized DSS data base management system is derived
in Figure 3 (Sprague and Carlson, 1 9S2 )
.
The model management subsystem is just as important to
the operation of a DSS as is the DGMS or the DBMS. The user
should have the ability to create new models quickly, and
access and integrate modules flexibly. It should have the
ability to catalog and maintain a generalized assortment of
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models? with direct significance to the decision making
process and problem solution. The DSS should have the ability
to establish a relationship between the models needed and the














Figure 3. A Generalized DSS DBMS Architecture
(Sprague and Carlson, 1982, p. 2***t )
In conclusion, it is critical to the development of a
decision support system (DSS) and, certainly to a group
decision support system < GDSS ) , that implementation is
conceptualized through decision theory and conflict
resolution methods. Ultimately, the formation of the
essential computer algorithms or models derived from this
conceptualization will be implemented as a computer-based
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decision support system. In a very real sense, ones'
understanding of decision theory and DSS design issues may
have dramatic effects on system effectiveness. Further, any
enhancement or limitation observed in the final, delivered




This chapter describes previous attempts to move through
the boundaries of single-user decision support systems to the
arena of multi—user decision support systems. In many cases
the early GDSS implementations were actually a series of
individual DSS ' linked to a centralized location through a
simple graphics interface. Usually, the decision making
process was site-dependent based on visual interpretation of
group results. In other words, the computers were physically
co-located with the focus on information aggregation and
shar ing
.
The implementations described below attempt to provide a
brief look at the development of group decision support
systems and the implementation of various resolution methods.
A. TECHNIQUES OF AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES
Due to their simplicity in algorithms, the techniques of
aggregation of preferences ar& likely the most popular group
decision techniques that have been computerized. Co-oP is an
example of such application. It includes the sums-of-the-
ranks, the sums-of-outrank i ng-re 1 at i ons , the additive func-
tion and the multiplicative function.
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B. INTERACTIVE MULT I -CR I TER I A DECISION MAKING (MCDM)
An interesting approach to mult'i-criteria decision making
allows for a very fluid approach to problem solving. Zeleny
(1982) describes interactive MCDM procedures as methods for
incremental articulation of preferences. A basic assumption
is that the decision maker's preferences develop and mature
only in conjunction with a particular problem. In other
words? human preferences are not fixed in time or established
in the singular, but are always changing, being situation-
dependent, circumstances-shaped thought patterns. The
important point to make here is that these evolving
preferences act as a learning process and should be taken
into account
.
In contrast, some MCDM approaches concentrate on a priori
articulation of preferences, or for example, they assume that
all necessary information about a decision maker's preferen-
ces can be extracted prior to the actual problem solving, in-
dependently of a given decision situation. In this view,
human preferences are relatively fixed and consistent, or
there is r\o significant learning process. These are the
primary assumptions underlying mu 1 t i at tr ibu te utility theory
and its derivative methodologies.
Other approaches do not attempt any substantial
articulation of preferences before or during the problem-
solving process. Preferences remain implicit, with the choice
being arrived at through other means. After the final
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decision or solution has been arrived at, the preference
structure can be made explicit. Therefore? these are the
methods for a posterior articulation of preferences. The
approaches included are linear mu 1 t i ob jec t i ve programming,
mu 1 t i par ametr i c decomposition, stochastic dominance, and
compromise programming.
The articulation of preferences in the interactive
approach is conducted through a dialogue management system.
An interactive conversational system) probably taking
advantage of computer graphics, provides an opportunity for
real-time interaction between program developers and the
decision maker. Such a system can guide decision makers to
what they consider the best compromise, without forcing them
into an exhaustive examination of all the trade-offs.
Co-oP is another computerized group DSS based on MCDM.
Its current version includes two MCDM technigues, i.e., the
Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980) and the ELECTRE
method (Bui , 19SE)
.
C. INTERACTIVE DECISION EVOLUTION AID (IDEA)
IDEA is a general framework of requirements and assump-
tions on which theoretically sound interactive methodologies
should be based. The IDEA approach is a graphic interaction
tool for aiding the decision maker in the search for a
solution. The following assumptions are emphasized.
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The decision maker's preference function' is unknown and
evolving throughout the decision process. It is situation-
dependent, subject to learning and "changes of mind."
The set of alternatives can be specified through con-
straints or through listing. The most preferred values with
respect to each objective can be specified. That is? the
ideal solution can be specified.
The decision maker prefers a nondominated solution to a
dominated one and would most likely accept the ideal if it
were available.
No weights of criteria importance are to be specified.
They are implicit in the attention levels accorded to
individual criteria during the selection process. No goals or
satisfactory values are to be specified beforehand.
The decision maker is expected to characterize each
solution as acceptable or unacceptable with respect to the
ideal. An inability to make such a declaration is interpreted
as indicating that the solution is unacceptable.
The decision maker must be allowed to introduce new
alternatives, to add or drop some criteria, and to be incon-
sistent in the expression of criteria importance.
The IDEA approach utilizes the following procedures:
(1) The set of all nondominated solutions or nondominated
extreme-point solutions is identified but not
displayed to the decision maker.
(2) The ideal and anti-ideal solutions are computed.
These two reference points identify the ranges or
potentials for change for each criterion. Criteria
potentials are displayed as a bar graph. The
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direction of improvement proceeds from the bottom to
the top of each bar
.
<3) The bars could be either presented in their original
incommensurate scales or scaled between and 1 in
terms of percentage values of the ideal.
( <+ ) The decision maker starts at the anti-ideal. The
decision maker generally attempts to exploit
available potentials* either fully or by
predetermined steps. Feasible increments or
decrements are predetermined because of the finite
listing of nondominated solutions.
(5) Any change in any potential is translated into all
remaining criteria potentials* and a new bar diagram
is displayed. Used-up portions are clearly
identified, and the remaining permissable changes are
d isp 1 ayed
.
(6) In a few preliminary steps the decision maker is
encouraged to reach for the ideal. Its unavailability
is guickly realized* and the notion of necessary
trade-offs is quickly learned. The purpose is to make
all potentials as small as possible so that the ideal
will be approximated as closely as possible. If all
potentials could be reduced to zero, the ideal would
be perfectly matched. In reality, there will be
combinations ofpotential residues which the decision
maker must judge in terms of their closeness to the
idea 1
.
(7) The decision maker is allowed to retrace, following
different paths, or use trial and error. It is desir-
able that multiple decision makers first use the
technique separately, later joining in a committee
for group negotiations. Ultimately the decision maker
enters a subset of points which are cyclically





One tests whether none of the compromise solutions is
truly acceptable. Their mathematical distances from
the ideal are computed, and the result?; are made
available to the decision maker for comparison. Some
of the less important criteria can be temporarilv
removed in order to decrease the dimensionality of
the prob 1 em
.
If none of the compromise solut:
acceptable, the problem must be
straints and new alternatives mu?
utions has been found
redefined. New con—
"st be brought into
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the picture? different criteria considered? or the
decision recommended for postponement. New
alternatives should be generated as closely as
possible to the ideal. Then the entire IDEA process
should be repeated.
D. EXPERT87*'": A BOOTSTRAPPING TECHNIQUE
This computer-based expert system shell captures the
"experts" knowledge base through reduction of the users
intuition, and not through specific rule production or
programming. Utilizing an individuals' intuitive knowledge,
it decomposes the process into objective components that are
more easily understood. The system utilizes a "function-
based" algorithm or algebraic formulation to replace the
decision makers' intuitive processes, which then acts as an
expert system. (Magic7, 1986)
E. SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed major implemented group decision
support systems and their design characteristics. Each
technigue described shares a similar characteristic in that
they operate under the assumption of cooperation.
The next chapter will attempt to expand a previously




. DESIGN ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING GROUP DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR NQN-COQPERAT I GN
A GDSS may be defined as a network of computer systems
that attempt to assist a group of decision makers resolve a
collective decision making problem, but more than this, it
must also assist in the collection or aggregation of multiple
inputs from various sites with different systems. This is
much more apparent then a single-user DSS since the design of
a GDSS depends on the kind of group decision setting to be
supported. In other words, many other factors such as
distance between decision makers' systems, time effects on
the system, centralization of control, and degree of coopera-
tion have a bearing on the implementation and use of a GDSS
(Jarke, 1986). Therefore, beyond the localized, site-
intensive use of an individual DSS (IDSS), the communications
interface is critical to the proper operation of a group of
interconnected individual decision support systems, or GDSS.
The differences between a individual DSS (IDSS) and a GDSS
may be observed in Figure ** . The main thrust is what a
developer must be aware of when designing a GDSS for
resolving non-cooperative decisions.
The single user in the top part of the figure represents
the traditional DSS model. The purpose of such a DSS is to
enhance the users' cognitive processing capabilities and/or
to facilitate the learning process. The bilateral
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relationship* between user and DSS provides no communications
support as required in cooperative decision making (Bui,
1985)
.
The second, or bo t torn. conf i gur at i on infers a multilateral
relationship between members of a group via a network of
individual DSS and group DSS. The functions of such a network












Figure * . I DSS to GDSS (Bui, 19B5, p. 60)
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of the group and the group itself. However, only individuals
interact with the system. The group as a whole is no longer a
single user of the system.
The above discussion and factors listed below are
concerned with the issues relevent to a GDSS such as Co-oP.
A. COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS IN A COOPERATIVE GDSS
A possible GDSS architecture is fashioned by four
integral components: the interface manager, the data manager,
the model manager and the communication manager (Bui and
Jarke, 19S£>). As discussed previously, the first three
components are necessary to assure the effective use of
Decision Support Systems ( DSS ) . However, the car efu 1 1 y- 1 a i
d
foundation of a computer-based group decision-making process
requires an additional function. This communication
management function seeks to; (i) reduce mi scommun i c a t i on
among (geographically) dispersed decisionmakers, (ii) support
formal and informal communication, (iii) simplify data
transfer protocols, (iv) offer flexibility in setting levels
of information sharing ranging from limited to free exchange,
and (5) accomodate protocol changes during the group
decision-making process.
Communications control in computer systems includes oper-
ations that enable data exchange to take place. In a larger
sense, communication protocols act as a set of rules and
computer- to—computer formats that allow the proper management
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of communication between two stations (Puzman and Porizek
,
1980). Distributed decision making (DDM) has been cited in
the literature as a method to link decision makers or groups
together through the use of communication ties (Rathwel 1 and
Burnsj 1985). As such, DDM results in a mechanism for inter-
action between multiple systems in an organization to allow
groups to cooperate with one another. DDM incorporates the
distribution of GDSSs and extends this network to allow
communications between DSSs . Built upon the DSS layer,
distributed decision making and its' communication component
is concerned with organizational communication and conflict
in decision making and planning (Huber, 198^).
Bui (1986) states that " estab 1 i sh
i
ng reliable and effic-
ient communication can only be viewed as a prereguisite for
supporting computer-based distributed group problem solving."
In addition, a generalized, communication-based GDSS not only
has to indicate to connected, individual systems how to
communicate, but how they should interact.
An architecture described to ensure the above reasoning
is based on the Open System Architecture OSA-RM (ISO, 1988).
This model defines a framework for providing data
communication links between systems. Specifically, five
communication functions are specified: link establishment,
transmission opening, data exchange, transmission
termination, and link releasing. The standardized model
advances the decomposition of the communication link into
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seven layers- The services provided by each layer are
described in Figure 5.
The reference to such a standard is justified by the fact
that the use of a-n ISO network model has many examples in use
and the standardization of protocols have? and are,
undergoing constant revision and updating. This model for use
with GDSS would; (i) minimize operating system incompati-










7 . App 1 i cat ion
Negotiation of access to the
transmission media
Physical management of data
transmi ss i on
Network routing and switching
End-to-end transport of message;
traversing any topology
Maintenance of the state of the
dialogue between nodes
Management of formats including
the format control phase,




Figure 5. The Layers of the ISO Reference Model
(Bui, 1986, p. 151)
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reliability* ease of maintenance and portability? and most
importantly, (iv) facilitate the integration of communication
protocols in GDSSs
.
The ISO architecture offers the modularity and transpar-
ency required for growth of distributed group decision supp-
ort systems within the communications framework and, more
importantly, allows the logical standardization of protocols
that are necessary for the application and presentation
layers to be mapped to an interactive decision-making
situation. Therefore the application and presentation layers
may be utilized in a GDSS with conversion protocols adapted
to a single user decision support system.
Bui (1986) maintains this logical standardization through
the use of a group norm constructor, group norm filter, and
an invocation mechanism within layer seven (application
layer). The group norm constructor will support service-
related functions within a GDSS and monitor communication
transfers between separate DSSs . This functional aspect will
define a framework from which a set of protocols may be
agreed upon by individual users of the GDSS. For instance,
the consensual ly agreed upon protocols or set of rules may
deal with items such as; (i) communications content, (ii)
styles, (iii) channels, (iv) timing, or (v) synchr on i z 1 1 on or
priority of messages. These parameters a,re received by the
group norm filter which then enforce the defined protocols
whenever communications are initiated by a GDSS user. When a
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data transfer request is received? the filter will check
whether or not the communication activity is within pre-
defined limits- If it is within valid guidelines, the com-
munication is continued. Otherwise, the group norm filter
would notify the user of the violation, and if required,
offer the group member the appropriate protocol values. The
last part of the GDSS application layer is the invocation
mechanism. The invocation mechanism is another protocol that
allows individual group members to request the possible
modification of the protocols previously defined within the
group norm constructor. Since the entire group has to achieve
consensus in order to change the protocols, this mechanism
offers flexibility of choice for the GDSS.
The presentation layer of a GDSS contains an Individual
DSS-to-Group DSS formatter which maintains a set of present-
ation protocols for any possible type of data exchange in a
group decision situation.
Based upon the above, four specific features necessary
in a cooperative GDSS arei (i) support for multiple view-
points of a problem, (ii) methods for aggregating the
preferences of multiple decision makers, (iii) parameters
that allow the establishment of several group norms, and (iv)
protocols that aid the organizing of the group decision
process (Bui and Jarke, 1986).
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B. COMMUNICATIONS SETTING FOR NON-COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT
The design objective here is to create a computer-based
environment favorable for constructive problem solving. Three
tasks can be enivsaged- The first and most crucial task is a
thorough orientation to clarify the p'otential GDSS user about
the nature and purpose of using the GDSS as a fair mediation.
The second is to manage ambivalence. The third is to
"socialize" the users into the appropriate norms (Kressel,
1 98 1 ) . The Norm Constructor should be used as a "social"
pressure to direct member toward support of the group norm in
collective decision making. The rationale and motivation of
these tasks are given below.
First, goa 1 --or i ented or outcome-oriented group members
are more disposed to encourage a "state of harmony" than a
"state of disharmony" (Zander, 1983). The Communications
component should be used to orient or tune the group members
to problem-oriented state. When focusing on problem-solving,
members are expected to become more tolerant of group
differences since they believe that tolerance is necessary
for the good of the group.
Second, egual participation in defining collective inten-
tions and actions have proven important in eliciting a common
problem. The GDSS should be built in such a way that it
promotes equal participation in constructing the group norm
by widening the spectrum of communications support.
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Third, the process of building a computer-based group
norm should be flexible enough to reflect the collective de-
cisionmaking structure, including power structure, and the
possible formation of constructive coalition.
Expanding GDSS to a non-cooperative environment commands
three additional design considerations.
First, focus should be on negotiation and settlement
support. Supporting a non-cooperative decision making can
refer to the manner in which the GDSS facilitates the
achievement of constructive group problem solving. Criteria
for an effective non-cooperative settlement process can be
defined by the following criteria (Blake, 1979; Deutsch
,
1973; Pruitt, 1981 )
:
(a) Resolution of all relevant issues.
(b) Technically correct agreements expressed in clear,
unambiguous language.
(c) Agreements that are fair and equitable
relative to prevailing norms.
(d) Creative agreements searching for new opportu-
nities that are beneficial to both parties.
(e) Satisfaction with the overall results.
<f ) Parties comply with their terms of the agree-
ments .
(g) Parties are better able to cooperate.
Second, emphasis should be on the behavioral process. The
GDSS should facilitate behavioral processes before helping
the decision-makers attacking tasks. The GDSS must be used as
a means to build trust and confidence. Such a prerequisite is
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necessary to increase the degree of acceptance. Among speci-
fic tactics by which a sense of trust and confidence may be
fostered are explicit statements of reassurance) the judici-
ous use of self-disclosure and the maintenance of confident-
iality. The outcome of such an effort is to reach a mutually
informed commitment to the recourse to a GDSS as a mediation
process. Such an emphasis on the behavioral process can be
achieved by providing the following capabilities:
(a) Cooperative orientation to the group members in
such a way that the parties define task as a
cooperative effort to achieve mutual or
compatible goals and avoid pseudo-issues that are
merely a bargaining ploy to gain leverage over
opponents (Rubin and Brown, 1975). Common
interests and similarities are heightened, while
downplaying opposite interests and values.
(b) Open Style of Communication: implies active,
mutual participation in the give-and-take of
nego t iat i ng
.
(c) Search for reasonable and persuasive goals: that
are well focused and achievable enough to
r eso 1 ve
.
Third, facilitating the tasks of the mediator. Recourse
to a human mediator or some sort of external agent may be
necessary can be helpful to increase the degree of acceptance
of the GDSS as a novel channel of collective decisionmaking.
An effective non-cooperative GDSS should attempt to help the
mediator accomplish this difficult task. When the role of the
mediator is strongly not appreciated by one or more members,
then he/she—and probably the GDSS— is no longer necessary.
The issues here rely on how well the mediator can use the
GDSS to .maintain confidentiality and, when necessary,
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disclose information. The GDSS must support the mediator and
educate him/herself about the nature of the problem
confronting him/her. In particular the GDSS should help the
mediator accurately diagnose the following aspects:
(a) The. prevalence of group member misdiagnosis. The
sources of misdiagnosis may include incomplete
information available.
(b) The multiple loci at the problem.
(c) The group member's understanding of the role of
the mediator. The mediator should have the
possibility to access to other sources of
information to expand his/her understanding.
C. USER INTERFACE
The development of either a DSS , or a GDSS dictates that
a professional, standardized, and context-oriented interface
between the user and the decision support system be
established (Ulright, 1982). For instance, graphics and color
can be used to display information in the form of pictures,
with standardized digitizing eguipment easing the input of
data or information into the system. One notion that
challenges the aPove premise concerning standardization is
that a group decision support system (GDSS) is a DSS that is
specially designed without having the configuration of
already existing DSS components (DeSanctis and Gallupe,
1935). In other words, every GDSS would, in reality, have
quite different aspects built into the dialogue management or
interface components. A generalized or specific GDSS is
designed with goal of supporting groups of decision makers in
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their tasks. The GDSS contains built-in mechanisms which
discourage or control development of conflict within these
groups. Interestingly enough, the dialog management system
covered in Sprague and Carlson (198E) for individual decision
support systems contain question-answer designs, command
language design, and menu design for input/output between
user and system. This dialog management or user-system
interface is based in software, as seen above, and hardware.
The GDSS system cannot be a number of copies of a single
DSS design with its respective user interface. It must be de-
signed as a group decision support system with specialized
and, as required, generalized interfaces. Regardless of the
specific decision situation, the group as a whole, or each
member, must be able to access a computer processor and
display information. According to Desanctis and Gallupe
(1985), "Most sophisticated systems will include databases,
along with model bases, very high-level languages for program
writing, and interfaces with standard manager i a 1 - 1 eve 1
software (graphics, stat i st i ca 1 /OR packages, spreadsheets,
etc . ) "
A group decision support system would work effectively if
decisions were made in a cooperative manner with little or no
conflict between members. However, this is very seldom the
case. Therefore, the dialogue management software must
provide for various conflicting situations. In other words,
an objective of GDSS should be to encourage the active
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participation of all group members. An important feature of
the GDSS may be the facility of allowing anonymous input and
evaluation of ideas. In addition, GDSS software might have
features that actively encourage group members to voice
dissident (or conflicting) opinions or play a "devil's advo-
cate" role before a critical decision is made.
Secondly? special accommodations are needed for groups
who have no prior experience working together. The GDSS
should support the group during the initial phases of group
formation. Special software might be used to query members on
their expectations of how the group should function, and to
feedback points of agreement and disagreement among members.
Finally, the measure of effectiveness for a user-system
interface may be based on some detailed, and possibly
qualitative measures such as; reduction in group conflict,
degree of consensus, and type of group norms to develop.
D. DATABASE MANAGEMENT
The purpose of group decision support systems is to
increase the effectiveness of decision groups by facilitating
the interactive sharing and use of information among group
members and also between group members and the computer
( Huber , 19B^-). Three types of information sharing are des-
cribed as essential to the decision support system in the
group meeting context. Data bases may be utilized for "real
time" analysis and discussion during a GDSS session. "What
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if" and other analytic software will enable the group to use
information, even ad hoc information entries brought forth
during the meeting, as input to interrogations made and
responded to in real time. Numeric information sharing is a
constant and critical decision aid during GDSS usage, where
what if and goal seeking analyses generate information that
leads to more informed choices. Sharing of textual infor-
mation may occur to increase the effectiveness of decision
maker s
.
The first occasion of textual information sharing is
where real time text editing is performed by an interacting
group. The second is where the decision group members bt& to
share gualitative variables, such as problems, causes, or
solutions that may occur during brainstorming, analysis-, or
planning. Relational information is often portrayed in the
form of relational data basess. A data base, then, is
extremely important in the group decision arena. Desanctis
and Gallupe (1985) describe the importance of a qualified
database when consideration is given to basic activities
performed during group decision making; (i) Information
retrieval includes selection of data values from an existing
data base, as well as simple retrieval of information (in-
cluding attitudes, opinions, and informal observations) from
other group members, (ii) Information sharing refers to the
display of data to the total group on a viewing screen, or
sending the data to selected group members' terminals for
7^
viewing, (iii) Information use involves the application of
software technology? procedures? and group problem-solving
techniques to data for the purpose of reaching a group
dec 1 s ion
.
Basic features of a GD3S should include a "state-of-the-
art database management system which can handle queries from
all participants? create subschemas as necessary for each
member , and control access to the database."
Bui? Jarke, and Jelassi (1965) support the view that a
large database be made available to a GDSS througn a micro-
to—mainframe link. The GDSS in this case would be geogra-
phically dispersed with the micro-computer being the local
node and the mainframe? with its' large economy of scale.
containing the centralized database. The reason? it seems? is
the rather apparent lack by a single-user DSS of facilities
for data sharing and/or exchange between decision makers. The
mi cro-ma i nf r ame architecture should support a link that? (i>
extracts information from another location for local proc-
essing? with or without updating the source? and (ii
initiates requests for remote processing which would be
impossible at the local level.
The following considerations for a collective database
management system should be taken into account :
Users access data simultaneously. When utilizing a common
source for data retrieval and update? or shared database.
concurrency control problems may become evident. A
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concurrency problem occurs when two or more persons access
the same data fields while others ar& attempting to modify
them. (Gray, 1981; Hewitt, 1976)
Users may have different areas of specialty. Differences
in users' skills lead to the need for knowledge sharing by
way of user-to-user communication (Jarke, 1986). In order to
enforce and allow this type of communications, protocols are
necessary to impose partial order on the access of trans-
action. Finally, there is a need, also within terms of an on-
line protocol or pre-arranged management, for a mutual
agreement on standardized terms and sub-databases to be used
during data transfer (Jarke, Jelassi and Shakun, 1985).
Users may have different viewpoints. A group of decision
makers often disagree about the exact alternatives, goals
and evaluation methods that may be taken. In even
cooperative settings the view of the facts may be different
for different decision makers.
Users may change their minds. This will obviously occur
during the negotiation process and can be viewed as part of
an evolution of systems design (Shakun, 1985). The data base
must embed a concept of evolution for individual and/or group
record representations.
Users may have secret rules and data. Often, individual
differences will not appear during negotiations within group
decision-making. These differences may result in hidden
agendas and data sets that are not represented openly. There
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is an organizational context outside the group. An
interesting point often forgotten when designing group
decision aids is the relationship between the group and their
associated GDSB and the organization. Sprague and Carlson
(1982) and Bui (1985) indicate that there are overriding
data, policies, and strategies of the organization.
Therefore, the database should have two design strat-
egies. In a subschema of the master database, a sub-database
used by the group must be provided and protected from outside
interference. On a strategic level, the database should
contain information and procedures concerning organizational
constraints imposed on the group decision process.
Bui, Jarke, and Jelassi (1985) discuss different levels
of multiperson activity that should be supported by the
database. On the first level or hierarchy a traditional
office automation setting is viewed. This is where clerical
tasks are supported and where concurrency control and know-
ledge sharing are at entry level.
A second level of office activity concerns joint analysis
and design tasks, such as performed professional staffs. The
DBMS must at this level support a higher level of
specialized, complex integration of different viewpoints as
well as multiple interactions of members within a trans-
action. It is assumed that users are still willing to co-
operate fully on the accomplishment of a task.
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At the third, and highest level of DBMS activity lies the
semi-structured or unstructured decision making task. It
would appear that at this level an inversion in tasks occurs
in that full cooperation of decision makers is a special
case. Collective decision situations are more often symboli-
zed by apparent conflict in which it appears ill-advised for
an individual decision maker to fully disclose his or her
structure of preferences. GDSS must therefore deal with
restrictions concerning partial preference divulgence and, in
extreme cases, must deal exclusively with deliberate
misinformation. In order to consolidate the above
"information hiding" and "misinformation" into an organi-
zation context, the database must incorporate information
about organizational policies, goals, and strategies (Bui and
Jarke, 1985).
A general database architecture for the GDSS level is
displayed in Figure 6. The figure illustrates the interaction
of sub-databases in a multiuser environment.
The figure illustrates the use of sub-databases in a mul-
tiuser environment, where, for example, player N represents
one decision maker and player M represents a second. Also,
there is a mediator that may be representative of a group
leader, or if without one, a series of software protocol that
simulate the mediation process of a negotiator or leader.
Player N can access his or her portion of the database which
contains that data and problem representation
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Figure 6. A Collective Database Design <Bui, 1 985 , p. 12)
most meaningful to the individual. Player M may do the same
thing with his or her allocation of data memory locations.
The mediator, through a set of predetermined protocols may
view either sides' problem representation, the shared databa-
se, and the joint problem representation. In other words, in
addition to the shared database, the mediator's access nc
include the semi-private problem representations of each
player. It is an interesting point that the group members do
not have access to any semi-private problem representations
but their own. Therefore, the shared database corresponds to
a regulated n-person database which offers concurrency
control that may be used as protection against outside
interference. Since this is a protection device against




The difference between this hierarchical database model
and traditional databases is that the individual problem
representations are only shared between one player (or group)
and the leader-mediator. At the same time, the joint problem
representation intervenes in the process of integrating and
possibly supports the evolution of various viewpoints. Both
types of sub-data bases are transparent outside the decision
group and the evolution of decision making is guided by
organizational information from the shared database.
According to Jarke (19B5)> there are two disadvantages to
the data sharing concepts cited above. The first disadvantage
stems from the current concept of a database transaction
(Gray? 1981) which is geared more towards concurrency control
than towards information exchange. Conseguent 1 y , DBMS uses a
concept of ser i a 1 i zab i 1 i ty which iterates that the effect of
the concurrent execution of a set of transactions must be
egual to that of any serial execution (Bernstein and Goodman,
1981). This can be a severe disadvantage if the purpose of a
user transaction is communication with another user. Further,
since transactions are supposedly independent, no mechanisms
exist to provide for them to communicate with them directly.
Secondly, most current DSS (or GDSS ) reside on microcom-
puters. Since the need for data management is explicit, the
attempts to integrate microcomputer DSS databases with each
other and with centralized mainframe databases are more
recent in nature.
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The following implementations should be included to
facilitate the use of databases within a group decision
support system:
(1) Locking mechanism: In a multiple user environment,
group members access data simultaneously. This may
lead to a situation in which two or more users access
that same data item while others are attempting to
alter it. This concurrency problem is particularly
prevalent in a non-cooperative environment in that
the search for orientation and understanding require
a lot of data transfer. Also, since data requests are
often short but frequent, the data component have
q-uick locking mechanisms that enable locking data
items before access, or validating a transaction
after its completion.
<2) Partial ordering on the access of transaction:
Differences in users's skills lead to the need for
knowledge sharing via user-to-user communication. To
keep track of information exchange and sharing, the
data component should include partial ordering on the
access of transaction.
(3) F i 1 ter i ng/sor t i ng / t i me stamping mechanism: procedure
using time stamp flags and a 1 phanumer
i
ca 1" sort to
highlight differences in opinion.
( ** ) Distributed and/or sub-databases: Transfer of indi-
vidual files to group databases or between individual
files should be possible.
(5) Procedure to enforce privacy: Privacy enforcement
mechanism should be made explicitly to all members.
(6) Communications using extended integrating rules to
turn on/off links with external database.
E. MODEL MANAGEMENT FOR NON-COOPERATIVE GDSS
Bui (1985) discusses group decision making in terms of
the modularization of group tasks into process-oriented and
content-oriented tasks and resulting models. The problems
associated with each in developing structured models are
1 i sted be 1 ow
:
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(1) "First, despite the efforts of the content-oriented
technology to help decision makers structure their
initially unstructured problem, some unstructured
parts will remain. This partial ' unstruc turab i 1 i t y
'
is due to uncertainty? fuzziness, ignorance, and an
inability to guant i t at i ve 1 y measure the complexity of
the decision situation and the decision makers'
preferences" (Stohr, 1981).
(2) "Second, attempts to resolve a group decision problem
are rendered more difficult by human irrationality
and emotionality when dealing with group interaction
(Pruitt, 1981). It is then necessary to search for
some process oriented methods that can support the
unstructured part left by the content-oriented DSS
,
as well as for some communication system that
collects, coordinates and disseminates information
within the group."
One problem that comes up is the determination of whether
a process-oriented or a content-oriented approach is best
suited for solving a particular decision problem. Although it
is assumed that a GDSS will decompose a group DSS into indiv-
idual and group decision support (sub-) systems, it has been
observed that decision making within organizations is often
sequentially performed by different decision makers assuming
different levels of expertise and responsibility, and using
different decision-making techniques. Therefore, a group
decision support system should provide models which support
both type of group interaction by (i) maintaining input/out-
put compatibility between the individual model component and
the group model component, and (ii) allowing mu 1 t i - t ask i ng
.
In a multiple criteria group decision-making environment, the
single user items stored in the individual model base should
be independent from each other, but logically interrelated
with the group decision model base. In other words, the
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models used by the individual should be connected to the
group decision model in order for an aggregation of data into
a group decision. Therefore? an individual should be able to
utilize multiple models for preference determination at a
concurrent rate while possibly using other applications.
Bui (1986) has listed several reasons for utilizing more
than one decision modeling technigue. None of the techniques
of aggregation of preferences currently known in -the liter-
ature can satisfy all of the five conditions imposed by
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow, 1963). The five rules
are: (i) complete ordering, (ii) responsiveness to individual
preferences, (iii) non- i mpos i t i on , (iv) non-dictatorship and
(v) independence of irrelevant alternatives. Arrow proves
that, in general, there is no procedure for obtaining a group
ordering that satisfies the five axioms or rules. In other
words, a collective decision cannot be made without violating
one or more of the five above mentioned rules. The
combination of various techniques or models will attempt to
use the same methods for aggregation of preferences in order
to have the best group result possible.
Finally, The combination of techniques will offer an in-
creased chance of group model acceptance and, therefore an
increased chance for reaching consensus during negotiation.
There are approximately ten algorithms that may be imp-
lemented as models in the Group Decision Support System for
derivation of aggregated individual preferences during
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cooperative decision making. The assumptions utilized under
these techniques are; (i) All participants of the group prob-
lem solving share the same alternatives, although they may
use different evaluation criteria, and (ii) Prior to the
group decision making process, each decision maker or group
member must have performed his or her own assessment of
preferences. The output of such an analysis is a vector of
normalized and cardinal ranking, a vector of ordinal ranking,
or a vector of outranking relations performed on the
alternatives.
The min—max principle is applied to concordance/d i conco-
rdance concept in ELECTRE , where a., collectively outranks a.,
when its lowest concordance and its highest d i sconcor dance
given by the group satisfy the outranking condition sanct-
ioned by the highest concordance threshold and the lowest
discordance threshold also given by the group. 4-n a coope-
rative decision making environment, the minimum of concor-
dance/maximum of d i sconcor dance concept often helps reduce
the number of non-dominated alternatives found in individual
analyses to a smaller or even unique collective altern-
atives). However, the min-max principle only works when
individual opinions are not extreme, and the number of
alternatives ar& sufficiently large to generate consensus.
Each group member can block a decision by setting a low
d i sconcordance threshold or by disagreeing completely in the
evaluation of the alternatives.
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The sums—of—the—outrank ing—rel at ions principle is derived
from the sum-of-the-ranks technique. According to Bui (1986),
its use should be planned carefully since experience has
shown that the idea of selecting the alternative that has the
highest number of outranking relations works fine only when
the number of alternatives are small.
The pairwise comparison majority rule suggests that the
alternative that receives a majority of votes against every
other alternative should be chosen.
The agenda setting rule or sequential pairwise comparison
(Black, 1958) favors the alternative that enters last in the
comparison process.
The sum—of—the—ranks rule (Borda, 1781) can be stated as
the sum—of-the-ranks given by different decision makers to a
specific alternative. In other words? a specific alternative
is ranked by a finite number of decision makers and these
ranks are added together. The lowest summed rank is chosen
and that alternative is selected. Due to its computational
simplicity this technique is widely used to determine con-
sensus ranking. However, when ties occur, results may be
d ifferent
.
The additive ranking algorithm applies when individual
assessments of alternatives are expressed in cardinal values.
A group evaluation of an alternative is the arithmetic mean
of the rankings made by all group members.
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The multiplicative ranking aims to give each group member
more impact on the group outcome. A group evaluation of an
alternative is the product of the rankings made by all group
members
.
The minimum variance method (Cook and Seiford > 1982) is
a.r\ extension of the sum-of-the-ranks technique. When there
are ties in ranking alternatives, this statistical algorithm
searches for an estimated ranking that is close to the true
ranking of the alternatives.
The .compromise ranking rule that has its roots in trans-
portation algorithms (Zeleny, 1982) > attempts to minimize
individual ranking differences by subtracting the rank mean
from each of the decision makers alternative rankings. The
lowest value is chosen for the decision process alternative.
The weighted majority rule is based on the observation
that the participants of a group may not carry the same
weight in the decision making process. Therefore, a vector of
weights must be included in the aggregation of preference of
rank i ngs
.
If no non-dominated alternative can be reached in the
first round of the group decision making process, negoti-
ations become necessary to resolve individual differences.
One method proposed by Bui (1985) and incorporated in this
work is the Negotiable Alternative Identifier (NAI). It is
based on a three step concept of a.r\ expansion/contr ac t i on/ i n-
tersection mechanism. The NAI algorithm attempts to help the
86
decision makers measure their degree of flexibility regarding
their individual assessment of preferences by examining their
distribution of preferences among alternatives. The NAI
algorithm uses differential techniques to group ranked alter-
natives into two classes of preferences; the preferred and
the least preferred sets of alternatives. Within each class,
negligible differences in preferences between alternatives
would increase the confidence of the decision makers not to
discriminate them. Consequently, it would make it easier for
the decision maker to trade them.
In other words? grouping alternatives that share close
evaluation corresponds to expanding the preference space(s>
of the decision maker from one best alternative to a set of
more or less equally preferred alternatives.
The contraction operation constitutes the second phase of
the NAI algorithm in which a given subset of satisfactory
alternatives obtained from the expansion mapping, is collated
into those that might exhibit a stronger preferential
distribution than others.
The third and last step is the intersection operation. It
derives a collective solution that is acceptable to all group
members. Consensus is reached when there is at least one
alternative that appears in every group member's subset of
the most preferred alternatives.
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F. SUMMARY
The previous discussion focused on a general izable
description of the design issues and problems inherent in the
implementation of a group decision support system ( GDSS )
.
Much like a DSS, a GDSS contains primarily the same
functional modules (e.g.* the database management system,
model base management system, etc.). However, the expansion
results in a system that is highly communication-dependent,
with the key toward group cooperation in a distributed
setting. Additionally, it is a primary responsibility of the
system to maintain a model base that will enhance group
decision aggregation with a strong degree of precision. The
user interface should not be machine-dependent, but
distributed with context-based graphics. Overall, the
challenge is to create a system that will allow the
flexibility required within the group decision arena.
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VII. EXPANDING CO-OP FOR RESOLVING SOME NON-
COOPERATIVE ISSUES
The primary goal of this chapter is to briefly introduce
Co-oP, and provide an insight into the major modifications or
enhancements made within the program source code.
Essentially, following the decription below and the major
functions found in Figure 8, one may assess that the major
enhacement to Co-oP is the functionality when dealing with
non-cooperative group decision-making. The entire Co-oP
system was previously implemented with Pascal code, and the
present addition of 6,000 lines of code deal with non-
cooperative and mediation modules. A further 3,000 lines of
Pascal code has been modified to include improvements in the
user interface (e.g., scrolling windows), code optimization,
and data manipulation functions.
A. NON-COOPERATION AS A GENERAL CASE OF COOPERATION
Assume that a GDSS for cooperation is a special case of
the GDSS for non-cooperation. Therefore, from a design point
of view, it would make a great deal of sense to use an imple-
mented GDSS for cooperation as a basic architecture that ca.n
be expanded, or modified to support non-cooperation.
CO-OP is a GDSS for cooperative multiple criteria group
decision support system consisting of the predefined model,
communications, interface, and database components described
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in the previous chapter. In its most developed state Co-oP
will be a network of microcomputer-based process-driven DSSs
for cooperative multiple criteria group decision making.
Every individual member of the decision-making process
maintains a DSS whereby the model base is based on multiple
criteria decision methods ( MCDM ) and other personal decision
aids. The group DSS , in turn, contains a set of aggregation
of preferences modules and consensus seeking algorithms that
may be used in addition to the individual MCDM. The primary
aspect concerning Co-oP at this juncture is the use of the
system for cooperative group decision support in which all
group members concur with the basic steps of a multiple
criteria problem solving process and norms imposed on the
group members of a collective decision problem. These steps
may be viewed within context of the CO-OP main menu and
Figure 7. These steps consist of (i) problem definition, (ii)
group norm definition, (iii) prioritization of evaluation
criteria, (iv) individual selection of alternatives, (v)
group selection of alternatives, and (vi) consensus seeking
and negotiation. These six decision processes dictate the
sequencing and timing of a CO-OP session, however, step
number six is the non-cooperative portion of the system.
First, the group must collectively reach consensus o^ a
specific decision problem and then define its' limits. In
other words, the group will share the same alternatives and
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MAIN MENU
1. MULTIPLE CRITERIA GROUP PROBLEM DEFINITION
E. GROUP NORM DEFINITION
3. PRIORITIZATION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA
**. INDIVIDUAL EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
5. COMPUTATION OF GROUP DECISION
h. IDENTIFICATION OF NEGOTIABLE ALTERNATIVES
7. Help
8. Exit
Enter a Number : C 1
Figure 7. The CO-OP Main Menu
evaluation criteria. The main problem with this initial task
is the assumption that the group, albeit with a strong
leader, will focus enough to agree on the primary problem at
hand and identify the alternatives and evaluation criteria.
Second, the group has to identify its members and assign
individual passwords and agree upon the way it handles data
transfers, interactive conversation, and the type(s) of group
decision technigues.
The third step pertains to the prioritization of eval-
uation criteria. This process may be performed either by
having the decision makers assign numerical weights (from 1
to 10) to the criteria directly using the ELECTRE method, or
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by assigning values according to the Analytic Hierarchy
Process ( AHP ) technique (Bui, 1985). The AHP algorithm
consists of the following steps; (i) Perform a pairwise
comparison of the evaluation criteria, (ii) Based upon the
matrix of evaluation, compute the priority vector by
computing the eigenvector of this matrix, (iii) For each
evaluation criterion, perform pairwise comparison of
alternatives using the same evaluation technique as used for
the criteria, and ( iv) Calculate the final vector of
priorities- The evaluation criteria may also have priorities
assigned according to a collective pool, sequentially based
on member expertise, or in an aggregate mode.
The fourth step allows the decision makers to utilize
his/her preferred algorithm (MCDM) to individually evaluate
al ternat i ves
.
The fifth stage is the computation of group results using
pre-defined aggregation of preferences techniques. Four
techniques of aggregation of preferences have been used in
CO-OP. They use the individual MCDM outputs to compute group
results. CO-OP also allows weighing of users' decisional
power
.
The most interesting point arises when a unanimous decis-
ion is not reached by the group. It is at this sixth and last
step that a consensus-seeking algorithm may be evoked to move
through the impasse. This algorithm is the Negotiable Altern-
atives Identifier (NAI).
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To review* one can observe that what has been
accomplished to this point is the development of a GDSS that
has included many of the conflict resolution methods
discussed in previous chapters. The current Co-oP system has
included the major facilities often thought of as being in a
DSS , however, it also facilitates the functions of
cooperative, non-cooperative (NAI) decision algorithms, and
the communications protocols required of a GDSS. Figure 8
illustrates the functional data flow of basic Co-op system.
B. N.A.I: A COMPROMISE-SEEKING ALGORITHM FOR
GROUP DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
According to Bui (1985), the use of techniques of aggre-
gation of preferences are simple and easy to learn and are
most commonly used in real world group decision-making situa-
tions. However, in many cases, it was noted that consensus
was very rarely reached after the first round of decision
making. It is related that techniques of aggregation of
preferences have proven inappropriate in providing a flexible
framework for identifying possible areas of negotiations, and
more important, areas of concession making. In essence, a
GDSS must be able to provide a facility to reach beyond the
simple consensus-driven algorithms utilized in aggregation of
preferences because the system would be incomplete and
probably not be utilized by a decision-making group. In
effect, when a technique of aggregation of preferences (e.g.,











































Figure 8. Major Functions of Co-oP (Bui, 19B5, p. 197)
9^t
may leave the group member ( s ) who do not agree with the
primary collective decision either unhappy or frustrated. It
is at this point that the members have to resolve the
conflict? and if not accomplished? the decision must te
forgone or delayed until conflict dissolution takes place.
The group decision support system will probably not meet the
needs of this group decision making situation and be
d i scarded
.
The importance of quantitative judgments as inputs to the
decision making process within groups is discussed by Wright
(1985). Judgmental input is needed as input to decision
making due to factors such as (i) lack of objective data,
(ii) high levels of uncertainty about future conditions and
effectiveness of actions? and (iii) the desire to include in
the decision things that are difficult or impossible to
measure. The most common method to assure the quality of
decisions is to obtain multiple opinions or to use a panel of
experts. However? if the group itself is the decision-maker?
then there are issues of equity among members? of satisfac-
tion with the decision-making process? and of commitment for
carrying out the action finally agreed upon. It is further
stated that the use of aggregation of preferences or
judgments will provide a potentially higher quality decision
considering a given set of criteria and evaluation methods.
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C. CO-OP II: AN EXPANDED GDSS ARCHITECTURE
Co-oP II is a expansion of Co-oP a GDSS for cooperative
multiple-criteria group decision making to tackle some clas-
ses of problems under hostile environment.
The following additional system functions destinguish
Co-oP II from Co-oP:
(1) An IDSS for the Mediator is added to the Co-oP sy-
stem. It gives the mediator the exclusive rights to
setup the communications protocols for the involved
parties (designed and implemented).
(2) A system component called TOUCHSTONE is attached in
parrallel (i.e. multi-tasking) to the Co-oP system to
facilitate the search for common goals. The purpose
of the TOUCHSTONE module is to provide a gradual
pace? involving a shift from a competitive to a
cooperative environment.
TOUCHSTONE is mu 1 t i wi ndow-based system composed
of (i) a modified Delphi technigue driven procedure*
and (ii) a Chatter Box to allow informal information
exchange defined and controlled by the commmun i cat i on
manager. Through TOUCHSTONE, the mediator guides
group members to agree upon a mutually acceptable
group norm (being implemented).
(3) Distributed database structure. Individual working
data files are stored at the individual level (e.g.,
local drives). Group results are stored in the group
database that can be accessed by individual members
according to certain group norms. Selective access
rights to databases are granted to the mediator
(being implemented).
<4> In each IDSS, a MESSAGE CONSTRUCTOR is attached to
the model component. The purpose of the message
constructors to help the group member to construct
messages in such a way that they are informative and
persuasive arguments before they are sent to others
(partially designed but not implemented).
(5) A Rule-based system to assist the mediator to dynami-
cally monitor the group norms throughout various




<6) A multi-attribute utility model is added to the group
model base to support trade-off between multiple goal
space (designed but not implemented yet).
D. PROBLEMS
Often, there are some competitive problems in which a
GDSS might not work. Such problems are characterized as
fo 1 lows
:
<1) High level of Intra-party conflict: if one of the
parties are ambivalent about the problem to be solved
or about the desirability of dealing openly and
fairly with other parties, it is logical to assume
that the recourse to a GDSS can be less useful. Group
member's ambivalence about using a GDSS may derive
from conscious or unconscious wishes to attack rather
than to negotiate; from fears of becoming vulnerable
because of the other's greater negotiating skills or
resources; and from ignorance of the goals and
methods of the mediator.
While the last two possible sources could be re-
medied by the Group Norm Constructor and the Help
facility in GDSS, gaining the crucial cooperation of
a group member is beyond the capability of the GDSS.
More important, the ambivalence generated by one
party can spread and intensify quickly to others.
(2) Well-established, rigid patterns of destructive
interaction. Studies of labor mediation reveal that
the worse the state of the parties' relationship with
one another and the more intense their conflict, the
dimmer the prospects for effective mediation. While a
GDSS is less apt to be perceived as impartial or
biased than the human counterpart, its use in a
intense and long-standing conflict can be inconse-
quential. The recourse to a GDSS is meaningful only
to parties experiencing moderate levels of conflict
and in whom there is some confidence.
(3) Scarcity of divisible resources. When resources are
scare, trade-offs among parties becomes difficult if
not impossible (particularly with the Mu 1 t i -a t tr i bute
Uti 1 ity Model .
)
( ^ ) Unbalance or disparities in relative bargaining
power. When their is unbalance in relative bargaining
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power, the stronger party is likely to be less
motivated to compromise and more likely to use
intransigent tactics. Meanwhile, the less powerful
party may react with passive concession or reactive
defiance (Deutsch, 1973; Rubin and Brown, 1975). Such
an ill-matched confrontation does not constitute a
sound basis for settlement (Kressel, 1981).
TOUCHSTONE and the mediator may not work.
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VIII. CRITIQUE ON N.A.I.
A. INITIAL COMMENTS
In order to follow this chapter, it is imperative to
understand the Negotiable Alternatives Identifier presented
by Bui (1985). This chapter pertains to a detailed discussion
of the NAI algorithm and proposes some new heuristics to
improve the contraction scheme. While NAI consists of an
important effort to allow a GDSS to support non-cooperative
decision making, it is not necessary to fully understand this
chapter to capture the overall discussion on non-cooperative
issues addressed in this thesis.
Further information attempts to illustrate and resolve
weaknesses of the NAI algorithm which arise in some situ-
ations. NAI becomes flawed in the contraction operation where
the most-preferred set of alternatives results. The algorithm
to determine the cut-off point for the set of the most
preferred alternatives performs worse and worse the higher
the degree of indifference of a decision maker. This is shown
with an example in section C. In Section D an algorithm is
developed to remedy these imperfections. Section E contains a
set of examples to demonstrate the results of the proposed
algorithm. A brief introduction of the basic concepts is
given in the next section.
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B. THE NAI ALGORITHM
To demonstrate • the working methods of the NAI algorithm
the following example is used. Table 3 exhibits the cardinal
rankings of a hypothetical couple who are searching for a
shopping place. Six alternatives are considered: Macy>
Mervyns, Sears? JC Penny, Woolworth, and Navy Exchange.
In the example? the cardinality n of the set of altern-
atives is 6. After determining the cardinality n the
structural index of preferences SId,i, where i = 2, ...»n> is
computed (expansion operation). The lowest SIdin determines
the subset of the preferred alternatives:
SId,n* = min (SId»i>
where n* (first cut-off point) represents the first n alter-
natives that form the subset of the preferred alternatives.
In step 2 (contraction operation) the cardinality n of
the set of preferred alternatives is n* . Here the ratios
Ld , i , where i = 2> . - - »n*> between the sum of all preferences
TABLE 3. INDIVIDUAL RANKINGS
CARDINAL RANKING ORDINAL RANKING
Husband Wife Husband W ife
Macy . 1 1 .40 5 1
Mervyns . 19 .20 3 2
Sears .22 . 17 2 3
JC Penny . 18 . 15 4 4
Woo 1 wor th .05 .06 6 5
Navy Exch ang e .25 .02 1 6
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assigned to the preferred alternatives and that of the resi-
dual alternatives are computed. The maximum ratio (Ld> i*)
determines the second cut-off point for the set of the most
preferred alternatives.
TABLE 4. THE RESULTS OF THE EXPANSION AND EXTRACTION
OPERATION
H J 5 band:
Al ternat i ve Sid ,n Ld , i
Navy Exchang e — —
Sears .57 .62*
lier vyns .41 .41
JC Penny .31* .48
Macy .33 —
Woo 1 worth .39 —
W if e :
Al ternat i ve SId,n Ld, i
Macy — —
Mer vyns 1 .00 .88
Sears .65 .57
JC Penny .^+9* .96*
Woo i wor th .57 —
Navy Exchang e .84 —
Step 3 intersects first all sets of the preferred alter-
natives and second all sets of the most preferred
alternatives of every decision maker.
In the sample case two persons are involved in the decis-
ion making process. The result of the expansion, and contrac-
tion operation is illustrated in Table 4. Table 5 shows the
intersection operation for both sets of alternatives.
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C. THE INDIFFERENCE CASE
To demonstrate that the algorithm determining the cut-
off point for the set of the most preferred variables does
not work an example of complete indifference is used. Conti-
nuing with the shopping example and assuming that the husband
does not care where to go shopping the following must be the
outcome of the MAI algorithm:
(1) The set of preferred alternatives is a subset (but
not a proper subset) of the set of alternatives.
(2) The set of the most preferred alternatives is a
subset (but not a proper subset) of the set of
a 1 ternat i ves
.
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An examination of table 6 shows that the most preferred
alternatives of the husband are Macy and Mervyns. In this
special case (indifference) the most preferred set of alter-
natives always contains two elements unconstrained by the
cardinal value of the initial set of alternatives. This
clearly contradicts with the required outcome (all alterna-
tives must be in the set of the most preferred alternatives)
and cannot be accepted as a solution.
It can be observed that in the indifference case SId,k
and Ld > k (k = 2, .., n* - 1) have always the same value. This
observation is utilized to develop an algorithm to compute
the cut-off point for the most preferred alternatives.
Instead of considering exclusively Ld , i to find out the cut-
off point it is proposed to take the difference between Ld > k
and SId,k under consideration.
TABLE 6. NAI RESULT OF COMPLETE INDIFFERENCE
Husband :





Macy . 17 — —
Mervyns . 17 .50 .50*
Sears . 17 .33 .33
JC Penny . 17 .25 .25
Woo 1 wor th . 17 .20 .20
Navy Exchanc e . 17 . 17* —
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D. CUT-OFF POINT ALGORITHM
Based on the assumption that the set of the most prefer-
red alternatives is always a proper subset of the preferred
alternatives, except all cardinal rankings are of equal
value, the following algorithm to compute the cut-off point
for the most preferred alternatives is proposed:
STEP ONE: (Initialization Step)




Remark: To set Ld , m to zero is necessary to assure that
the scanning process which is performed in step two works
under each possible condition. In the shopping example the
zero value is assigned to Ld , 6
.
STEP TUP: (Scanning Step)
Remark: The idea of the scanning step is to obtain the
differences D,k between Ld , k and SId»k. This scanning process
starts at k = 2 and continues until either D,k is less then
zero and D,k-1 is greater than zero or k is equal to the
cut-off point ( n* ) of the set of the most preferred
a 1 ternat i ves
.
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2. 1 . Set k = 1 , where k = ( 1 , . . ,s*) > where s-* = stopping
point of the scanning process
2.2. k = k + 1
2.3. Set D,k = Ld , k - SId,k
2.^+. 1 . If D,k = 0,
then z = z + 1 , (Count where D,k = 0)
Go to 2.2
2.4.2. If D,k > 0,
then p = p + 1, (Count where D,k > 0)
Go to 2.2
2.4.3. If (k = n*) OR ((D,k < 0) AND (D,k-1 > 0>),
where n* is the cut-off point for the preferred set,
then set s* = k
,
Go to Step THREE (Stopping point is found)
2.4.4. Go to 2.2
STEP THREE: (Solution Step)
3.1. If (s* = 2) and (D,2 < 0),
then L , cut = 1 ,
where L,cut is the cut-off point for the set of the
most preferred alternatives,
Go to END
Remark: Solution for the cut-off point is found.
3.2. If (s* - 1 =2) AND (n* <> s*> AMD (D,2 > 0),




3.3. If 2 = k - S,
then L, = s*,
Go to END
Remark: Solution for the indifference case
3.4. If <<D,k-l >= max CD,1>) OR <<p = k-2) AND (p >= 1)))
AND (p > 1) OR ((k-2-p-z) >= 1)) AND (ca,l <> ca,2),
where 1 = l>...»k— lj
where ca,l and ca>2 are the cardinal rankings of the
alternatives which are ordinal ranked first and
second »
then L > cut = 1 ,
Go to End
3.5. L,cut = max <D,k>, where k = 2, ...» n* - 1,
Go to END
Remark: The maximum value of the set of D,k is calcu-
lated to determine the cut-off point
End ; Solution has been found
E. EXAMPLES
Two examples are shown to demonstrate that the proposed
algorithm performs better than the original one. The indif-
ference case and the first example are used to recognize the
d i fferences
.
The result of the NAI algorithm for the indifference case
is shown in Table 7. A satisfactory result is obtained. The
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sets of the preferred and most preferred alternatives contain
all alternatives, which concurs with the expected outcome.
Table 8 illustrates the outcome of the proposed MAI
algorithm using the initial example which is discussed in
section B. The result for the husband concurs with the
initial one and is not shown again. Considerable differences
TABLE 7. THE NAI RESULT OF COMPLETE INDIFFERENCE,
CALCULATED WITH THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Husband :




d i na 1
k i ng
SId,n Ld, i
Macy . 17 — —
Mer vyns . 17 .50 .50
Sears . 17 .33 .33
JC Penny . 17 .25 .25
Woo 1 wor th . 17 .20 .20
Navy Exchange .17 . 17* —*
occur in calculating the most preferred set for the wife. As
a result of the proposed algorithm only one alternative (the
initial set contains four alternatives) is contained in the
most preferred set. Examining the cardinal rankings one can
observe the following:
(1) The cardinal value for the favorite alternative of
the wife (shopping at Macy) is two times higher than
her next favored alternative (shopping at Sears).
(2) She favors (^0%) shopping at Macy almost as much as
going to the remaining five shopping places.
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Both of the above- points are reasons why it makes more
sense that the set of the most preferred alternatives con-
tains only one element. So , one can conclude that the pro-
posed algorithm shows much better results than the original
one where only the maximum value of Ld , i was determined- One
cannot claim that the current algorithm shows always desire-
able results under each condition, since the set to test such
TABLE 8. THE RESULTS OF THE EXPANSION AND EXTRACTION








SId,n Ld , i
Macy .^0 — — *-
Mer vyns .20 1 .00 .88
Sears . 17 .65 .57
JC Penny . 15 .4t9* .96
Woo 1 wor th .06 .57 —
Navy Exch ange .02 .84 —
algorithm tends to infinity. But one can assume that in most
situations, even in very special ones < e . g . •» indifference
case), the proposed algorithm shows a satisfactory solution.
108
IX . CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS AND CAUTIONS REGARDING A
GDSS APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The purpose of this thesis was twofold; (i) Explore some
design issues for building group decision support systems for
non-cooperation environments? and (ii) Expand CO-OP, a
cooperative multiple criteria group decision support system,
to support some particular classes of non-cooperative group
decisions. Specifically, the following features have been
added to CO-OP:
(1) Scrolling windows to handle group problems with
1 arge size.
(2) Code optimization to provide fast feedback to group
members
.
(3) Improved heuristics for the Negotiable Alternatives
Ident if ier
.
( A- ) Implementation of the Mediator module.
<5) Allow a more advanced data manipulation algorithm to
promote data exchange in competitive environments
(e.g., data security and sharing).
Assuming that the sine gua non of effective non-cooper-
ative problem solving is to restore the trust and confidence
of the parties, the most important mission of a GDSS is to
reduce resistance to use the system as a channel or medium
for resolving a collective problem. Even under the best of
circumstances, attaining this mission ca.n be very difficult.
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A GDSS in a non-cooperative environment as opposed to a
cooperative environment should <i) seek and maintain
acceptability (ii) while simultaneously intervening to reduce
hostilities and effectuate a more promising interpersonal
climate. The Group Norm Constructor discussed in this paper
can be used to implement an array of tactics to separate the
parties, invoke norms of cooperation and fair play, interr-
upting dysfunctional or hostile exchanges, educate the
parties about their mutual role in negative transactions,
invoke their mutual interest in solving the collective
problems, and so on.
Since the ability of the parties to cooperative with one
another is the primary predictor of a successful outcome
(Kochan and Jick, 1978), several observations and caveats of
the GDSS approach are in order. First, the use of a GDSS
seems appropriate only for parties for whom an ambience of
cooperation already exists or where the prospects of
developing it quickly are relatively good. The recourse to a
GDSS for a joint problem-solving venture should make sense to
all involved parties.
Under certain circumstances,. GDSS could be used as a
appropriate means to handle non-cooperative problems with a
minimum of competitive conflict in that a GDSS is a promising
adjunct to the exclusive use of human mediation in orchest-
rating a constructive group decision making process. Benefits
1 10
derived from using GDSS may include the improvement of
communication, understanding, and problem settlement.
Is the process of designing non-cooperative GDSS germane
to a human and formal negotiation? May it be equal ly j or more
helpful in this respect than non-GDSS mediation (probably
better than inexperienced mediators)? For what types of
parties is what communications norms most likely to be
helpful? Much more research is needed before we can even be
confident that attempt to build GDSS for negotiation is
fruitful. What are the criteria to distinguish a "coop-
erative" (constructive) stance from a "non-cooperative"
(destructive) one? How to identify obstacles that stand in
the way of achieving a constructive settlement? What GDSS
intervention strategies are the most useful?
Ill
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